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Abstract
The success of multimodal data fusion in deep learning
appears to be attributed to the use of complementary in-
formation between multiple input data. Compared to their
predictive performance, relatively less attention has been
devoted to the robustness of multimodal fusion models. In
this paper, we investigated whether the current multimodal
fusion model utilizes the complementary intelligence to de-
fend against adversarial attacks. We applied gradient based
white-box attacks such as FGSM and PGD on MFNet,
which is a major multispectral (RGB, Thermal) fusion deep
learning model for semantic segmentation. We verified that
the multimodal fusion model optimized for better prediction
is still vulnerable to adversarial attack, even if only one of
the sensors is attacked. Thus, it is hard to say that existing
multimodal data fusion models are fully utilizing comple-
mentary relationships between multiple modalities in terms
of adversarial robustness. We believe that our observations
open a new horizon for adversarial attack research on mul-
timodal data fusion.
1. Introduction
Deep learning models can have multiple types of data as
inputs. When a number of data types are being engaged in
the processing of information, it is called multimodal data
fusion models [12, 6]. Multimodal data fusion deep learn-
ing models have focused on improving the performance of
the model. Efforts to utilize multimodal data to improve the
prediction performance of deep learning have been made in
a number of tasks. Many studies in computer vision took
account of multimodal data fusion when researchers want
to enhance the performance such as for medical image seg-
mentation [4, 9], semantic segmentation [8, 15], and person
re-identification [18, 14].
However, relatively less attention has been devoted to the
research on the modality of the deep learning model in ad-
versarial attack and robustness. We intend to fill this re-
search gap between multimodal data fusion and the adver-
sarial robustness. In previous studies, it has been known
that the performance enhancement of multimodal data fu-
sion deep learning is attributed to the complementary ef-
fects between multiple modality data [11]. In our experi-
ment, the fusion deep learning model using multimodality
was as vulnerable to adversarial attacks as a single-modal
model. Therefore, it is hard to say that existing multimodal
deep learning models are fully utilizing complementary re-
lationships between multiple modality data.
In this paper, we consider the problem of adversarial
vulnerabilities in the multimodal context. Our experiments
show that even if only one of the multimodal inputs is at-
tacked, it is significantly lethal to the entire performance of
the model. Recent studies in the adversarial attack research,
the increase of input dimensions [5, 16] has a negative im-
pact on adversarial robustness. Overall, the contributions of
this study are mainly in following two aspects:
• First, we analyze and spotlight the adversarial robust-
ness of multimodal data fusion. We explore the possi-
ble adversarial vulnerabilities in the multimodal deep
learning model. We examined how effective the com-
plementary relationship of current multimodal data fu-
sion models in the sense of adversarial robustness.
• Our paper also presents the empirical evidence of the
adversarial vulnerability of multimodal data fusion.
We conducted experiments to find how adversarial ro-
bustness changes with different attacks, different ep-
silon perturbations in a multimodal data fusion model.
By combining the experimental results with theoretical
explanations, we are able to find a better interpreta-
tion and improvement on the adversarial vulnerability
of multimodal data fusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
2, related works are introduced. In section 3, experimental
settings and results are presented. The conclusion is drawn
in section 4.
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2. Related Works
The multimodal data fusion has become a rapidly grow-
ing research field (imageword, imageaudio, multiple im-
age sensor data). In this paper, we focus on handling
multiple image sensor data based multimodal data fusion
method. Single-task and multitask learning methods with
multimodal data focused on obtaining better shared repre-
sentation from multimodal data. By doing so, the model
receives complementary information from other modal and
shows consistent performances when there is a lack of par-
ticular information [10, 11, 17]. Supplementing missing in-
formation allows the model to predict more accurate. How-
ever, there has been limited analysis on the adversarial at-
tack and defense in the multimodal context. In this paper,
we analyzed the vulnerability of multimodal data fusion
deep learning models.
2.1. Multimodal Encoder-Decoder Networks
Among many different tasks, we focused on a seman-
tic segmentation so that we could evaluate the multimodal
data fusion model in an adversarial robustness context. For
efficient multitask learning with a shared feature representa-
tion, multimodal encoder-decoder network was introduced.
[2] Since shared representations from different multiple
modalities enhance the performance of models, multimodal
encoder-decoder networks are commonly used for the se-
mantic segmentation. [2, 11, 17]
2.2. Adversarial Attack
For semantic segmentation tasks, the multimodal ap-
proaches performed well in terms of prediction accuracy.
However, they exposed to serious vulnerabilities by the ad-
versarial attacks below. Adversarial attacks are perturba-
tions that cause misclassification and malfunctions of deep
learning network. Among a variety of adversarial attacks,
two gradient based methods were used in our experiment,
which were found to work effectively in the semantic seg-
mentation task.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [7]. Goodfellow
et al. (2014) introduces a one-step attacking method, which
crafts an adversarial example x′ as
x′ = x+  ∗ sign(5xL(θ, x, y)), (1)
with the perturbation  and the training loss L(θ,x,y).
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [13]. Madry et
al. (2017) proposed PGD, which is an iterative variant of
FGSM. In each iteration, PGD follows the update rule
xt+1 = Clip(x,)(x
t + αsign(5xL(θ, xt, y)). (2)
The clip function Clip(x,) keeps x
(t+1) within a pre-defined
perturbation range.
3. Experiments
3.1. Experiment Settings
We conducted the experiments with public Multi-
spectral Semantic Segmentation dataset [10]. The dataset
is a public dataset made up of pairs of visible RGB and 814
µm thermal infrared(IR) that captures urban scenes. The
dataset consists of 1569 RGBs and thermal imaging pairs.
820 of them were collected during the daytime and the re-
mains were collected at night. There are 9 classes including
the unlabeled background class. It has 480 × 640 spatial
resolution size. The training set consists of 50% of the day-
time images and 50% of the night images. The validation
set is 25% of the daytime and 25% of the night. The rest of
the images were used for testing.
For the base network, we used MFNet [10] as our base-
line network. It has an encoder-decoder network. Since the
dataset has a high resolution, a mini-inception block with
dilated convolution is adopted in the encoders of MFNet.
3.2. Evaluation Metrics
We adopt three metrics for the quantitative evaluations
of models. Two of them are for the semantic segmenta-
tion performance and the rest is used to assess robustness
against adversarial attacks. The first one is the accuracy
for each class, which is called as recall. The second is the
intersection over union (IOU) for each class. The average
value of each metric for all classes is referred to as mAcc
and mIoU, respectively. They can be obtained through the
formulas below:
mAcc =
1
N
N∑
i=1
TPi
TPi + FNi
, (3)
mIoU =
1
N
N∑
i=1
TPi
TPi + FNi + FNi
, (4)
where N denotes the number of classes. The origi-
nal MFNet paper did not consider unlabeled class in
performance measure, but we included unlabeled back-
ground class for more accurate compare. TPi =∑K
k=1 P
K
ii , FPi =
∑K
k=1
∑N
j=1,j 6=i P
K
ji and FNi =∑K
k=1
∑N
j=1,j 6=i P
K
ij are the true positives, false positives
and false negatives for each class i, where K is the num-
ber of frames, PKii is the number of pixels for class i in the
frame. PKji is the number of pixels for class j that is incor-
rectly classified as i in the frame k, PKij is the number of
pixels for class i that is incorrectly classified as class j in
the frame k.
The other metric is the IoU ratio of robust (IoUR), used
for evaluating the robustness of models [3]. It is defined as
follow:
IoUR =
mIoUAP
mIoUCO
, (5)
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 1. Evaluations of adversarial attacks on MFNet multimodal data fusion model. The IoUR value of the baseline model equals to one.
(a), (b) and (c) denote the FGSM attack and (d), (e), and (f) refer to the PGD attack results.
where mIoUAP denotes the mIoU of an adversarial image
and mIoUCO denotes the mIoU of a clean image [3, 1]
3.3. Evaluations for Adversarial Robustness
We observed how model performances change with dif-
ferent types of adversarial attacks on multimodal data fu-
sion. We conducted experiments using FGSM [7] and PGD
[13] attacks (Table 1 and Table 2). As we increase the l∞
norm of  perturbation, both attacks have a crucial impact
on the performance of multimodal data fusion models. Not
only when both of inputs were attacked, but also when only
one was attacked. For example, in the case of FGSM at-
tack, the IoUR decreased from 41.9% to 38.1% when we at-
tacked on the RGB sensor. When we generated adversarial
perturbations on IR, the IoUR was decreased from 54.6%
to 38.9%. On the other hand, PGD attacks on RGB sensor
made the IoUR decreased from 52.8% to 36.9% while it
descended from 55.2% to 40.6% for the IR case.
From the above experiments, we verified that the multi-
modal data fusion model is still vulnerable to the gradient
based adversarial attack(Figure 1). Even if only one of them
is attacked, the overall performance of the model is remark-
ably degraded.
3.4. Discussion
Multimodal data fusion models have gradually improved
their predictive performance. By using multiple input data
in places with adverse weather conditions or limited vis-
ibility, multimodal data fusion models have succeeded in
utilizing useful information from multiple modalities. How-
ever, our observations suggest that the benefits of improving
prediction performance are not necessarily applicable to the
adversarial robustness of the multimodal data fusion model.
Network architectures and algorithms, which have been op-
timized to focus on improving the prediction, were still vul-
nerable to normal adversarial attacks. Our explanation is in
line with the statement that adversarial examples come from
useful but non-robust features. To achieve a fully comple-
mentary relation network between multiple modalities, we
need to seek ways to obtain not just useful but also robust
features.
4. Conclusions
The adversarial vulnerability of multimodal data fusion
deep learning models is spotlighted in this paper. Com-
pared to the model performance, adversarial defense of
multimodal data fusion models has received little attention.
Our experiments show that current multimodal data fusion
model does not fully utilize the complementary information
Table 1. FGSM Attack on Multimodal Data Fusion Models (l∞ norm of  is the perturbation when the image is normalized from 0 to 255).
FGSM Attack
10 20 40
l∞ norm of  mAcc mIoU IoUR mAcc mIoU IoUR mAcc mIoU IoUR
Attack on RGB 0.196 0.158 0.419 0.174 0.144 0.381 0.155 0.132 0.350
Attack on IR 0.221 0.206 0.546 0.155 0.147 0.389 0.136 0.129 0.342
Attack on RGB+IR 0.141 0.127 0.337 0.121 0.113 0.300 0.114 0.106 0.281
Table 2. PGD Attack on Multimodal Data Fusion Models (l∞ norm of  is the perturbation when the image is normalized from 0 to 255).
PGD Attack
10 20 40
l∞ norm of  mAcc mIoU IoUR mAcc mIoU IoUR mAcc mIoU IoUR
Attack on RGB 0.232 0.199 0.528 0.151 0.139 0.369 0.117 0.108 0.286
Attack on IR 0.232 0.208 0.552 0.163 0.153 0.406 0.133 0.125 0.332
Attack on RGB+IR 0.151 0.132 0.350 0.112 0.104 0.276 0.111 0.103 0.273
of multimodality in the sense of the adversarial robustness.
Our findings prompt us to recognize the adversarial vulner-
ability of multimodality and open a new horizon for adver-
sarial robustness research on multimodal deep learning.
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